Introduction
The black economy consists, by definition, of activities concealed from the law. Its measurement, therefore, suffers from the problem that if the source of income and expenditure data is the Inland Revenue, no black economy activities will be in it; and if it is not, some black economy activities may be in it and some not. Despite assurances about confidentiality, people may have no incentive to reveal the true extent of their activities to the data collector from fear that they may not be, after all, protected from the law. Thus, there is no single method which can give an accurate measure of the black economy. The many different approaches suggested and explored in the literature use mainly expenditure data, which may be reported more accurately than income data. Good surveys of this literature exist, and suggest that in the United Kingdom the size of the black economy is somewhere in the region of 5 percent of reported activity.' *This study began as part of the Institute of Fiscal Studies project on the shadow economy, which produced the book bv Stephen Smith (1986) . We are grateful to the Institute for supporting our research and to Stephen Smith fo; his 'advice and comments at all stages of the research. We have also had helpful discussions with Jan Magnus, Costas Meghir and Manuel Arellano.
'See Smith (1986) , from which we draw heavily. The theoretical literature on tax evasion was surveyed by Cowell (1985) , who also lists some of the measurement literature.
Our definition of the black economy is the narrow one of activity that should normally be reported and taxed but is not. Smith's (1986) thorough review of research in this area concluded that black economy activity is concentrated amongst the self-employed, who run mainly small family businesses. There is a concentration of this kind of enterprise in agriculture, forestry and fishing (which is a very small sector), construction and distribution, and repairs: the plumber who offers a discount for payment in cash is the typical black-economy practitioner.
Altogether, the selfemployment sector employs about 10 percent of the civilian labour force and adds as much to GDP. The national accounts are adjusted upwards by something like 15 percent of reported self-employment income to account for tax evasion, so the size of the black economy implicit in this is not more than 1.5 percent of GDP. This figure, however, is probably a lower bound, as it is based on the assumption of accurate reporting of all expenditures on GDP.
The assumptions underlying the measurement of the black economy in this paper draw on the findings of Smith's study and are consistent with the assumptions underlying the adjustment of the national accounts.' They are two:
(1) the reporting of expenditure on some items by all groups in the population is accurate;
(2) the reporting of income by some groups in the population is accurate. The data that we use for our analysis come from the Family Expenditure Survey (FES). The item of expenditure in the FES where we believe reporting is most accurate is food. Foor expenditure is recorded on a daily basis from a diary kept by a member of the household for a week. It is highly unlikely that the person tilling in the diary (usually not the income earner in oneincome families) will conceal some seemingly small food expenditure for tax reasons, or that he or she will call 'business expenses' part of the household food bill. In contrast, expenditure on other items may be concealed if it is conspicuous and believed to arouse curiosity, or some expenditure, e.g. on clothing or car maintenance, may come under 'business expenses '.3 With regard to our second assumption, we assume that only the selfemployed under-report their income. We experimented with other pro-'On the latter point, see also MacAfee (1980) and Dilnot and Morris (1981) . 3We ran a few regressions with other items of expenditure to check the consistency of our estimates with food. The items we tried were clothing, services (repairs, car maintenance, personal services, etc.) and, 'pre-commitments' (mortgage, rent, television licence, etc.). The results were mixed with no clear-cut evidence of under-or over-reporting.
Closer inspection of the data convinced us that the only expenditure item that could be relied upon to give accurate estimates of income under-reporting was food. Apart from the reasons given in the text, the other items of expenditure are less regular so there are several zero entries and several positive outliers in the reference week. Dealing with these types of data requires different techniques from the ones we employ here, so the estimates obtained from other items by application of our techniques are not strictly comparable with our food-based estimates.
fessional groups but we could not find evidence of under-reporting. Given that reported self-employment income is about 10 percent of GDP, our estimates imply that the size of the black economy is about 5.5 percent of GDP. Thus, our estimate is remarkably similar to the average figure that can be obtained from the several estimates in the literature [see Smith (1986) ] but it is higher than the implicit estimate of the size of the black economy in the National Accounts. where Uj is a vector of parameters, Bj is a scalar 'marginal propensity to consume' good j, and ~~~ is white noise. Yp is the measure of income that influences consumption decisions. For food expenditure this measure is likely to be less variable than observed income. We refer to it as permanent income, without necessarily requiring that the expenditure function conforms exactly to the permanent income hypothesis. The importance of the distinction between permanent income and measured income for our purposes is that for given permanent income, the measured income of the self-employed may be more variable than the measured income of employees in employment. If this is correct, our measure of income under-reporting by the self-employed will have to be adjusted accordingly. In general, we assume that permanent and measured income are related by where pi is a random variable. The expected value of pi for each household depends on aggregate events: in a 'good' year pi will have a mean above unity. We make the critical assumption that the mean of pi is the same for the employees in employment and the self-employed. Its variance may be different for each group and in general we expect the variance of pi to be bigger for the self-employed than for the employees in employment. Now (1) and (3) imply that the log of permanent income is
Income and expenditure
In YP=ln Y;-lnp,+lnk,.
The assumptions underlying (1) and (3) imply that if we use reported income in place of unobserved permanent income in (2), there are two additional random regressors, -In pi and Ink,, each entering with coefficient fij.
Since we do not have data on either pi or ki we make some assumptions on their distribution over households, to make estimation tractable. Thus, we assume that both pi and k, are log-normal, and write them as deviations from their means:
The random variables ui and vi have zero means and constant variances, 0,' and CJ:, within each occupational group. We do not need to make assumptions about any covariation between ui, Ui and Eij at this stage. 4 We have argued that: (a) the employees in employment report their incomes correctly, so for them ki= 1 and 02 =O, whereas for the self-employed we should generally expect to find pLk > 0 and 0," > 0;
(b) the mean of pi, denoted by p, is the same for each occupational group, but the variance 0,' is bigger for the self-employed than for the employees in employment. ' By the log-normality of pi the mean of pi and the mean of its log, pP, are related by (7) and so, if we use subscript SE to denote the self-employed and subscript EE to denote the employees in employment:
By the convexity of logs, equality between the means of pi implies that the mean of the log of pi of the self-employed is less than the mean of the log of pi of the employees.
Substituting now from (4), (5) and (6) into (2) we get:
Suppose we estimate this equation separately for the self-employed and for employees in employment, but impose the restrictions that the trj and pj are common. Then the intercepts of the equations should differ because P~-,L+ is not the same in each group. The variance of the errors of each equation should also differ, with the self-employed generally having bigger variance. These differences in the estimates can be used to obtain an estimate of income under-reporting for the self-employed.
"The assumption of log-normal ki obviously violates the restriction kih 1, i.e. that no one over-reports income. Estimation with truncated errors is not possible for this problem because the regression error is a composite of the three errors, ui, rir and E,~, which cannot be individually identified. See the regression equation (9) below.
'Since pi shows differences between normal and actual incomes due to time effects and chance events, its distribution may be taken to be independent of the distribution of Yp. Then from (3) mean actual income is the product of p and mean permanent income. Our assumption of equal ~7 for the self-employed and other employees implies that transitory aggregate events affect all occupational groups equi-proportionally.
An estimate of the black economy
We estimated eq. (9) for food expenditure by running regressions form:
In Cij= Z,Uj + Bj In Y: + yjSEi + vi, of the (10) where SE, is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if household i is headed by a self-employed individual and 0 if it is headed by an employee in employment.
All other households were excluded from the estimation. We estimated the regression separately for two broad occupational groups, 'white-collar' and 'blue-collar'. The appendix gives the definitions of the statistical series used in the estimation of (10) and the adjustments made to them (where appropriate).
A few remarks are in order here. Self-employment is defined by our data source according to independent criteria, but we prefer to define it as consisting of all households with income from self-employment of at least 25 percent of total income. With this definition we capture some households who may classify themselves as employees, yet may have a sizeable part of their income from selfemployment and so have ample opportunity to engage in black economy activities. Our definition and the FES one are, however, highly correlated and the results with each are virtually identical.
We inevitably miss any under-reporting of small amounts of self-employment income earned by fulltime employees, who have occasional opportunities to work on their own account. These employees cannot be identified from the FES, since most of them would report zero self-employment income. Table 1 gives some descriptive statistics from our sample. As in the national averages, about 12 percent of white-collar workers and 8 percent of blue-collar workers in our sample are classified as self-employed. The income and food expenditure of the self-employed are higher than the corresponding entries for the employees in employment.
But the most striking difference in the data is in the standard deviations of incomes, where for the self-employed it is twice as high as for the employees. A Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for lognormality of income shows that log-normality is not rejected at the 95 percent level for any group, at the conventional approximation used to derive critical values for the test. Thus, the data give some support for the assumptions made in the preceding section about income and its distribution. The error vi in the regression eq. (10) is, by assumption, heteroscedastic. We estimated (10) under the assumption that its variance takes only two values: one for the self-employed and one for the employees. The estimates obtained are consistent with our assumptions.
Reported income Yi was treated as endogenous and instrumented. This enables an independent estimate of the residual variance of reported income for each group, which we exploit in the calculation of income underreporting.
We discuss our estimation procedure and report the estimates of the coefficients of (10) in the appendix. Here we give a table of the coefficient estimates that we use in the calculation of income under-reporting. These are the marginal propensity to consume, pj, the coefficient on the selfemployment dummy, Yj, and the residual variance of reported income, 0:. The variance of 9i for each group, & and c&, is also of interest and is given in the table (see table 2 ).
The marginal propensity to consume food is estimated to be 0.270 for households in white-collar occupations and 0.235 for households in bluecollar occupations.
The ranking of the coefftcients may be a little surprising,
given that average incomes in white-collar occupations are higher than average incomes in blue-collar occupations but the estimates are very close to each other. The marginal propensities to consume are the same for employees and for the self-employed, as our working assumptions require. We tested for differences in the coefficients of the self-employed and employees by introducing the dummy variable SE, interactively with income but rejected the null. The t-statistic for the interactive term in the white-collar regression was -1.0 and in the blue-collar regression -0.9. We also tested for non-linearities in the effect of income on expenditure by introducing the square of the log of income in each regression as an additional regressor. The t-statistic in the white-collar regression was 0.9 and in the blue-collar regression 0.3. Thus, we also rejected the null of non-linearity.
The coefficient on the shift dummy, SE,, is positive and similar in value for both classes of occupations. Thus, the self-employed appear to consume more than the employees in employment after controlling for income and household characteristics. We come to the interpretation of this estimate and its implications for under-reporting below. We tried several other shift dummies, for other occupational groups, but they were all insignificant.
The residual consumption variance for the self-employed is always higher than the residual consumption variance for the employees, as we hypothesized. This variance is a composite of the variances and covariances of three types of errors, as (9) makes clear. In order to get an independent estimate of the variance of errors in income, we calculated the residual variance from reduced-form regressions for income, of the form:
where Xi is a set of identifying instruments. The residual ii is again a composite of three errors: unexplained variations in permanent income, deviations of actual from permanent income, Ui, and deviations of actual from reported income, ui. By our previous argument concerning the properties of ui and vi for the self-employed and the employees, the residual income variance of the self-employed should exceed the residual income variance of the employees. Table 2 confirms this for both occupational classes.6
From the discussion of eqs. (5) (6) and (8) we conclude that yj estimates:
6We cannot use reduced forms like (11) to obtain a direct estimate of under-reporting because we do not know if the earnings function of the self-employed is the same as the earnings function of the employees. In general they are not, because of self-selection, e.g. the selfemployed may be more risk-tolerant and their incomes may reflect it. Our working hypothesis is that given incomes and other household characteristics, the food consumption functions of the two groups are the same.
"?j=BjCPk +~("iSE-atfEE)l~ (12)
The estimate we are interested in is of the mean value of ki, the number by which average reported self-employment income has to be multiplied to give average true income. Let this number be g. By the assumed log-normality of ki we have:
Thus, to go from the estimated coefficient on the self-employment dummy to an estimate of mean under-reporting we need to know the variances of Ui and ui. In general these are not known, but some inferences about them can be made from the estimated residual income variance.
Suppose that the unexplained variations in permanent income in (11) have the same variance for both the employees and the self-employed. This is not an unreasonable assumption, given that these variations are due to omitted variables and that the self-employment dummy is one of the regressors in (1 l).' Then by the assumption that the employees do not under-report their income we have:
Expanding the variance of u -u and translating to the symbols of table 2 we write (14) as:
From (12) and ( 13) we obtain, Comparison of (15) with (16) shows that our estimates of the residual income variances of the two occupational groups do not give us enough information to calculate the degree of under-reporting. But it is possible to calculate a range for mean under-reporting, by reasoning as follows. Consider variations in the variances 0&E and & that satisfy condition (15) for given values of the other variances (which we treat as parametric) ' We have no way of checking this assumption from our data (or from any other readily available data source). We make it as an identifying assumption, since without a restriction on the variance of permanent income we cannot derive the variances of u and u that are needed in our estimates. If self-employed permanent incomes have more variance than other permanent incomes, in contrast to our hypothesis, the estimated variance of u and v for the self-employed in (15) would be less, with ambiguous effect on our estimates of average under-reporting. However, the difference would not be big, as the discussion that follows will make clear. and given the partial correlation coefficient p between usE and vsE. The question we pose is whether our estimate of mean under-reporting in (16) varies within a small range when C-J& and &a vary over their feasible range. It is easy to check that if p =O, there is a small well-determined range for mean under-reporting; but if p#O some difficulties arise, which we discuss below.
If p = 0 (15) implies that u,& and c& are negatively related, so (16) gives a lower bound for mean under-reporting when & takes its lowest value and an upper bound when &a takes its lowest value. The lowest feasible value for f~&, is 0, so (15) and (16) Translating this into the mean value of ki, the number by which mean declared incomes have to be multiplied to arrive at true incomes, by taking antilogs we find k[ = 1.28 for white-collar = 1.51 for blue-collar.
We qualify E by subscript 1 to indicate that this estimate of mean under-reporting is a lower bound.
We have argued earlier that self-employed incomes have at least as much variance as salaries and wages, so the minimum feasible value for &a is 2 cruEE. Thus, the upper bound on the degree of under-reporting is obtained when & = I&. In this case (15) and (16) imply, Comparison with (17) shows that our range for mean under-reporting is symmetric. With the estimates in table 2 we get in this case k, = 1.54 for white-collar = 1.64 for blue-collar.
A comparison of the upper and lower bounds for under-reporting shows a small range in the estimate, especially for blue-collar workers. The reason is that for blue-collar workers in particular, the estimated randomness in the reported income of the self-employed is not much higher than the estimated randomness in the income of the employees in employment.
In the case where the covariance between u and v is zero, the difference in the estimated randomness of incomes imposes an upper bound on the sum of the variances of u and v.
But if the covariance between u and v is not zero, the sum of the variances of u and v can be higher. For this reason, it is worth considering what the covariance indicates and whether it is reasonable to assume that it is equal to zero.
Whether this covariance is zero or not depends on what assumptions we make about the propensity of some people to under-report their incomes by more than others. It is plausible to argue that if a self-employed person landed an exceptionally good job in one year, he or she might be less inclined to declare the income from it than if the source of income was regular. If the income is exceptional, a tax return that does not show it is not likely to arouse the taxman's curiosity. Similarly, if in one year a selfemployed person happens to have below normal income, he or she may be more inclined to declare it. The tax on it may be proportionally less and not declaring part of it may give rise to a declared income that is small enough to arouse curiosity. Behaviour of this kind gives rise to a positive covariance between ui and vi. Zero covariance requires that whatever the income of the self-employed person turned out to be in any particular year, his or her tendency would be to report the same percentage of it to the tax authorities as in previous years.
Unfortunately, if the covariance between u and v is positive it is not possible to calculate a range for under-reporting without further information on the distribution of u and v. But we can show by example that even high correlations between u and v do not affect our previously estimated range by very much.
If the correlation between u and v is small, it is possible to show that our estimate of under-reporting is an under-estimate (this is likely to be the case also for high correlations).
We consider, therefore, what happens to our estimated upper bound, E,,, as the correlation coefficient p becomes positive. In this case (15) and (16) Thus, even p = 1 does not raise our previously obtained estimates by very much. Smaller correlation coefficients reduce the effect further. If p =OS, the estimates fall to 1.66 for white-collar and 1.74 for blue-collar workers respectively. We may conclude that although a positive correlation between chance variations in income and chance variations in under-reporting may raise our estimate of average under-reporting, the effect it is likely to have on the estimate is not very big. A reasonable mid-point estimate for mean under-reporting, even with positive covariance, is a little below 1.5 for whitecollar workers and about 1.6 for blue-collar workers, averaging at about 1.55 for all self-employed individuals.
Conclusions
Our estimate of the size of the black economy in Britain, defined 'in the narrow sense of income-earning activities that are concealed from the taxman, relies on two assumptions. First, expenditure on food by all groups in the population is correctly reported in the Family Expenditure Survey. Second, employees in employment report their income correctly but the selfemployed may conceal part of it. On the basis of these assumptions and some others on the stochastic distribution of actual and reported income, we estimated consistent food expenditure equations for individual households. By inverting these equations we were then able to arrive at the conclusion that on average reported self-employment incomes have to be multiplied by a factor of 1.55 to give true incomes. Since income from self-employment amounts to about 10 percent of GDP, our estimate implies that the size of the black economy is about 5.5 percent of GDP. This estimate is higher than the Inland Revenue's implicit estimate of 1.5 percent of GDP but it is consistent with most of the other microeconomic evidence.
We found some evidence that 'blue-collar' workers conceal on average a little more of their income than 'white-collar' workers, 60 percent as compared to 50 percent or less. But our estimate of under-reporting by white-collar workers has a bigger range and may be as high as 80%.
Appendix: Data and estimation
The data we used come from the 1982 Family Expenditure Survey and relate to individual households. We selected our sample according to the following criteria:
(a) each household has two adults; (b) the head is either employed or self-employed; (c) the second adult is the wife; (d) the household lives in Great Britain; (e) no obvious inconsistencies can be detected in the data used; (f) the quality code (A268) for self-employment income is less than 2 (the interviewer actually saw a written record of income receipts from self-employment).
After selection, we had 2,208 households, of which 925 were classified as white-collar (the occupation code for the head taking values 1 to 5), and the remaining 1,283 as blue-collar (occupation 6 to 8).
The data on incomes given in the survey had to be adjusted in one important respect: while earnings from employment recorded in the survey were received in the few weeks or months before the interview, selfemployment income related to the last available record, usually for the previous year. If we were to use the data without correcting for the different timing, we would risk finding spurious income 'under-reporting' for the selfemployed due to inflation. Fortunately, information is provided on the precise date that the reported self-employment income was received (codes A226 and A227), and resealing is possible.
We proceeded as follows: we took annual figures for income from selfemployment (CSO, Blue Book, 1985) , net of tax-evasion corrections, and divided these by the number of self-employed individuals (Department of Employment Gazette). An annual per capita series was thus obtained, and monthly observations were calculated by linear interpolation.
We thus obtained a monthly rate of inflation of self-employment incomes which we used to update the recorded incomes from self-employment. KIDSI, KIDSZ. Cff, WM, ROOM, LAT, REN, SEDW, FWO. PTW coefficients (pj) and the coefficients estimated for SEDI (yj) in the regressions overleaf. The variances of v] are the residual variances of these regressions, for the observations pertaining to the self-employed and to the employees in employment separately. The other variances given in table 2 are the residual variances from regressions of log income (LNCY) on all the other independent variables in the food regressions [the Z variables of eq. (1 l)] and the 'additional instruments' listed below (the X variables). The reduced form income regressions are of no particular interest so they are not reported.
